The German government provides subsidies to foster investments in broadband infrastructure – a key element in reaping economic and social benefits of digitalisation. This paper finds that the subsidies rely on flawed assumptions about the motivation and behaviour of subsidy-receiving telecom companies (free-riding fear, low demand, red tape) and suffers from ill-designed targets in its execution (time gaming, cream skim-ming administrative rivalry). Finally, it proposes policy recommendation.
This paper discusses the introduction of the UBI in the Russian Federation by shortly presenting its theoretical approaches and the need for poverty reduction in the country. The paper argues that political feasibility for UBI is low as increasing taxes (required to finance the additional public spending) will be vetoed by politically and economically highly influential oligarchs that regard their wealth to be at risk from new taxation.
This policy briefing analyses the applicability of performance results and targets (PRT) in four policy areas of the Russian Federation (poverty reduction, safety, education, health,). Even when meeting their pre-conditions, successful application of PRT in the Russian administrative tasks is rare (access to health care, partially poverty reduction measures). Difficulties to design a PRT system, misguided incentives, and the weak structure of Russian administration hamper potentials.